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Abstract. It is not uncommon to think that the existence of exhaustive and 
infallible divine foreknowledge uniquely threatens the existence of human 
freedom. This paper shows that this cannot be so. For, to uniquely threaten 
human freedom, infallible divine foreknowledge would have to make an 
essential contribution to an explanation for why our actions are not up to us. 
And infallible divine foreknowledge cannot do this. There remains, however, an 
important question about the compatibility of freedom and foreknowledge. It is 
a question not about the existence of foreknowledge, but about its mechanics.
INTroDuCTIoN
In this paper, my main goal is to argue that infallible divine foreknowledge 
(IDF) cannot uniquely threaten human freedom. Successfully arguing 
for this claim will help to explain why some, like David Hunt (1999), 
have found it ‘preposterous’ to think that IDF by itself could undermine 
freedom.1 Hunt writes, for example, that ‘the supposed incompatibility 
of divine foreknowledge and human freedom lacks all prima facie 
credibility’ (1999: 20). At the same time, however, I believe that there 
remain interesting and significant questions about the compatibility of 
IDF and human freedom. I will highlight one such interesting question 
in particular, a question about the mechanics of IDF, arguing that debate 
about freedom and foreknowledge would profit from focusing more 
1 Another writer who has made this same point is William lane Craig (1987). See also 
(Hunt 1998).
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directly on this question than on those arguments typically forwarded to 
show that IDF poses a significant threat to human freedom.
In the first section of the paper, I will explain more carefully what 
it would take for IDF to uniquely threaten human freedom. What we 
will see is that for IDF to uniquely threaten human freedom, it must 
be that IDF makes an essential contribution to an explanation for why 
what humans do is not up to them. I will argue in section two, however, 
that IDF cannot make this sort of essential contribution. So, IDF cannot 
uniquely threaten human freedom. In section three, I attempt to re-focus 
the debate on freedom and foreknowledge by moving this debate away 
from the question of whether the existence of IDF by itself undermines 
human freedom and toward a  related question about whether the 
mechanics required for explaining IDF threatens human freedom. This 
latter question, I contend, is one concerning which there is more fruitful 
future discussion to be had.
I. WHAT IT WoulD be For IDF To uNIQuelY 
THreATeN HumAN FreeDom
In section two, I will argue that mere IDF alone could not pose a unique 
threat to human freedom. before doing so, I  need to explain what 
this claim amounts to. I need to explain, that is, what it would be for 
IDF itself to uniquely threaten human freedom. I  will do that in this 
section by presenting a version of the freedom-foreknowledge argument 
commonly used by philosophers to argue for the incompatibility of IDF 
and human freedom and by comparing this argument with two other, 
similar arguments. What we will see is that for IDF to uniquely threaten 
human freedom IDF needs to make an essential contribution to an 
explanation for why what humans do is not up to them.
We can start by building a simple version of the freedom-foreknowledge 
argument typically used by philosophers to argue that IDF undermines 
human freedom.2 To present this argument, we will make use of some 
claims about God’s foreknowledge, some claims about what philosophers 
call ‘accidental necessity’, and some claims about freedom. begin with the 
theological claim that:
(1) God believes at t1 that Joe mows his lawn at t100.
2 The presentation here follows roughly that outlined in (Zagzebski 2011a). Another 
classic contemporary source for this argument is (Pike 1969).
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let t1 be a past time long, long, before t100, and let Joe be an ordinary 
human agent and let his lawn-mowing be pre-theoretically as good 
a candidate as any for a  free action. (1) is secured by the assumptions 
that God has exhaustive foreknowledge and that Joe in fact mows his 
lawn at t100.3 Now, given traditional assumptions about God’s infallibility, 
the following claim is also true:
(2) Necessarily, for all times t and propositions p, if God believes at t 
that p, then p.
Thus, God’s believing at t1 that Joe mows his lawn at t100 entails that Joe 
mows his lawn at t100. These are all of the theological claims we need for 
our argument.
Next, we need to make three claims about what philosophers call 
‘accidental necessity’. Accidental necessity is a kind of necessity which 
propositions about the past have in virtue of being about the past.4 Since 
what these propositions report is over-and-done-with, there is nothing 
that can now be done about it. This is a quality, our arguer claims, which 
all propositions about the past have. Thus,
(3) Necessarily, if p is a proposition about the past relative to a time t, 
then p is accidentally necessary at t.
A second important feature of accidental necessity is the following:
(4) For all agents S, actions A and times t and t’, if it is accidentally 
necessary at t’ that S does A at t, then at t’ it isn’t up to S whether S 
does A at t.
The support for (4) is that, intuitively, we can’t do anything about what is 
necessary. because we can’t do anything about what is necessary, what is 
necessary isn’t up to us. If, at our time, something is necessary at another 
time, then we can’t make it otherwise than it is – its being so is not under 
our control. This appears to be paradigmatically the case for the sort of 
3 I am oversimplifying a bit here. In order to secure (1) it must also be the case that (i) 
God knows by having beliefs, that (ii) God’s beliefs are in time, and that (iii) propositions 
about the future don’t change their truth-values such that, for instance, at t1 Joe will mow 
at t100 but at t2 Joe will not mow at t100. (i) has been denied by (Alston 1986) to which 
(Hasker 1988) replies. (ii) has been denied by, inter alia, (Stump and Kretzman 1981), 
though it has been argued that the timelessness solution is not sufficient to address the 
philosophical problem of freedom and foreknowledge in, inter alia, (Zagzebski 2011b). 
(iii) has been denied by (Todd 2011), to which (byerly forthcoming c) replies.
4 Zagzebski (2011a) is especially clear about this.
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over-and-done-with necessity that ‘accidental necessity’ is supposed to 
constitute. If S’s doing A  were now over-and-done-with, for instance, 
then it would not now be up to S whether S does A. The final important 
claim we need about accidental necessity is that it works like certain other 
kinds of metaphysical necessities in that it obeys axiom K contained in 
all five classical systems of modal logic. Applied to accidental necessity, 
this axiom tells us that:
(5) If p is accidentally necessary at t, and p entails q, then q is 
accidentally necessary at t.
(3), (4), and (5) are all of the principles about accidental necessity we 
need for our argument.
The final principle we need for our argument is a  principle about 
freedom. The principle says:
(6) For all agents S, actions A and times t, if it isn’t up to S at t whether 
S does A at t, then it is not the case that S does A freely at t.
(6) is supposed to be simply an analytic truth about the nature of free 
action. From (1)-(6) it follows that it is not the case that Joe mows his 
lawn at t100 freely. For, by (1), God believed at t1 that Joe would mow at 
t100. And, by (3), that God so believed is accidentally necessary at t100.5 
but, by (2), that God so believed entails that Joe mows at t100. Thus, given 
(5), Joe’s mowing at t100 is accidentally necessary at t100. (4) then implies 
that it isn’t up to Joe at t100 whether Joe mows at t100. And, by (6), this 
implies that Joe doesn’t mow freely at t100.
Since Joe was an arbitrarily selected human agent and his mowing 
was just as good a candidate for a free action as any, the argument here 
presented generalizes. IDF, the argument attempts to show, presents 
a  significant problem for human freedom. This is because of claims 
about foreknowledge, claims about accidental necessity, and claims about 
freedom. Thus, we have a powerful argument for the conclusion that no 
human beings ever perform actions freely that is motivated by claims 
about IDF.
5 This step assumes that God’s believing at t1 that Joe will mow at t100 is a proposition 
about the past relative to t100. of course, the ockhamist response to the argument for 
theological fatalism denies this claim. See, e.g., (Warfield 2010). Nonetheless, the claim 
that propositions like (1) are not propositions about the past has proven difficult to 
defend. See, e.g., (Todd forthcoming).
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let the above argument suffice for a  presentation of the freedom-
foreknowledge argument as it is typically found in the philosophical 
literature. The argument attempts to show that IDF threatens human 
freedom. our question here, though, is whether IDF uniquely threatens 
human freedom. In the remainder of this section, I  want to consider 
what this claim amounts to – what it would take, that is, for IDF to 
uniquely threaten human freedom. I then argue in the next section that 
IDF cannot do this.
To get clear on what it would take for IDF to uniquely threaten human 
freedom, it will be helpful to highlight how the freedom-foreknowledge 
argument just presented bears certain significant similarities to two 
other arguments. In fact, following linda Zagzebski (2011a and b), 
we might think of these three arguments as forming a  family of three 
fatalistic arguments. They are all fatalistic arguments because they all 
provide arguments for the conclusion that no person ever performs any 
action freely.
The freedom-foreknowledge argument presents an argument for 
fatalism by appealing to exhaustive IDF. The claims this argument makes 
which will distinguish it from our other two fatalist arguments are (1) 
and (2). (1) is a supposition justified by the presumption of exhaustive 
divine foreknowledge, whereas (2) is secured by the doctrine of divine 
infallibility. These two claims, when combined with (3)-(6), make trouble 
for human freedom.
but, we can generate arguments that threaten human freedom which 
parallel this argument for theological fatalism by replacing (1) and (2) 
with non-theological claims. First, we can replace (1) and (2) with claims 
about truth-values of propositions about the future. by doing so, we will 
get what is typically called the argument for ‘logical fatalism’. Here we 
will replace (1) with
(1’) It was true at t1 that Joe mows his lawn at t100.
and we will replace (2) with:
(2’) Necessarily, for all times t and t’ and all events e, if it was true at t 
that e occurs at t’, then e occurs at t’.
With (1’) and (2’) in place, the rest of the argument trots on as before. 
The argument now purports to show that the mere fact that there are 
propositions about the future actions of humans which are true in the 
distant past threatens to undermine human freedom.
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Similarly, we get an argument for causal fatalism by replacing (1) 
and (2) of the argument for theological fatalism with claims justified by 
causal determinism. Causal determinism is typically defined as the thesis 
that the state of the world at any time together with the laws of nature 
entails the state of the world at all other times.6 In accordance with causal 
determinism, we might replace (1) with
(1’’) The state of the world at t1 is S and the laws of the world at t1 are l.
and we might replace (2) with
(2’’) Necessarily, if the state of the world at t1 is S and the laws of the 
world at t1 are l, then Joe mows his lawn at t100.
Here, ‘S’ is a placeholder for a complete description of the state of the 
world w we are imagining in which Joe mows his lawn at t100 and ‘l’ is 
a  placeholder for the laws of w. (2’’) simply reports a  consequence of 
the causal determinist’s thesis – namely, that in any world with the past 
and laws of w, Joe does as he does in w. Thus, we have a  third fatalist 
argument, this one generated by claims justified by causal determinism.
We have seen, then, that the freedom-foreknowledge argument as it is 
typically presented has much in common with these two other fatalistic 
arguments – the argument for logical fatalism and the argument for 
causal fatalism. Given the similarity of these arguments, what we must 
now consider is the following: What would it be for the freedom-
foreknowledge argument to show that IDF poses a  unique threat to 
human freedom?
If IDF is to pose a threat to human freedom which is to be distinct 
from the threats posed by the logical and causal fatalist arguments, 
then it must be that premises (1) and (2) make a significant difference 
over premises (1’) and (2’) and premises (1’’) and (2’’). For (1) and (2) 
to make a significant difference over (1’) and (2’), and (1’’) and (2’’), it 
must be that there is some reason for thinking that actions are never up 
to us, given claims like (1) and (2), which reason is not supplied given 
only either claims like (1’) and (2’) or claims like (1’’) and (2’’). For, each 
of these three fatalist arguments is supposed to show that freedom is 
threatened because claims like the first two premises of the argument in 
view imply that our actions are not up to us. Thus, for IDF to uniquely 
threaten human freedom, IDF must supply unique reason to think that 
our actions are not up to us. It must be that claims like (1) and (2) support 
6 See, e.g., (Hoefer 2010)
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this conclusion in a way that it is not supported by claims like (1’) and (2’) 
or (1’’) and (2’’). To use the specific example referred to in (1) and (2), it 
must be that God’s infallibly forebelieving at t1 that Joe mows his lawn at 
t100 provides special reason for thinking that Joe’s mowing at t100 is not up 
to Joe – reason which is not supplied by (1’) and (2’) or by (1’’) and (2’’).
Now, what is it for claims like (1) and (2) to supply special reason 
for thinking our actions are not up to us in this way? I  submit that it 
is for claims like (1) and (2) to make an essential contribution to an 
explanation of why our actions are not up to us. It is for claims like (1) 
and (2) to make a contribution to an explanation of why our actions are 
not up to us which contribution is not made by any other claims – like 
(1’) and (2’) or (1’’) and (2’’). In our example, it is for God’s infallibly 
forebelieving at t1 that Joe mows his lawn at t100 to make an essential 
contribution to an explanation of why Joe’s mowing at t100 isn’t up to him 
– a contribution not made by (1’) and (2’) or (1’’) and (2’’). It may be, 
of course, that the fact that Joe’s mowing isn’t up to him is explanatorily 
overdetermined – that there are, in addition to God’s infallible forebeliefs 
about Joe, other equally good explanations of why Joe’s mowing isn’t up 
to him. but, if IDF is to make a difference – if it is to supply special reason 
for thinking that Joe’s mowing isn’t up to him – then it must contribute 
to an explanation for why Joe’s mowing is not up to him, and it must 
do so in a way that its contribution is irreplaceable. Thus, to claim that 
IDF poses a unique threat to human freedom is to say that IDF makes 
an essential contribution to an explanation for why our actions aren’t up 
to us – that, e.g., God’s forebelieving at t1 that Joe mows at t100 makes an 
essential contribution to an explanation for why Joe’s mowing at t100 isn’t 
up to Joe. In what follows, instead of saying that IDF ‘makes an essential 
contribution to an explanation for’ why what we do is not up to us, I will 
sometimes simply say that IDF ‘uniquely explains’ why what we do is 
not up to us. In the next section, I will argue that IDF cannot uniquely 
explain in this way why what we do is not up to us. IDF cannot, then, 
uniquely threaten human freedom.
II. WHY ForeKNoWleDGe CAN’T uNIQuelY THreATeN 
HumAN FreeDom
What we saw in the previous section was that if IDF is to pose a unique 
threat to human freedom, then God’s infallibly forebelieving at t1 that Joe 
mows his lawn at t100 must uniquely explain why Joe’s mowing isn’t up to 
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him at t100 – God’s infallible forebelief must make an essential contribution 
to an explanation for why Joe’s mowing isn’t up to Joe. I  now want to 
argue that God’s infallibly forebelieving at t1 that Joe mows at t100 cannot 
uniquely explain why Joe’s mowing at t100 isn’t up to Joe. more generally, 
IDF cannot uniquely explain why our actions are not up to us. So, IDF 
cannot uniquely threaten human freedom.
To see why God’s infallible forebelief about Joe cannot uniquely 
explain why Joe’s mowing isn’t up to him, we must attend to a question 
I will call the explanation question. The explanation question asks about 
the explanatory relationship between God’s forebelieving at t1 that Joe 
mows his lawn at t100 and Joe’s mowing his lawn at t100. This is subtly, but 
importantly, different from asking about the explanatory relationship 
between God’s forebelieving and whether Joe’s mowing is up to him. 
What the explanation question asks about is the explanatory relationship 
between God’s infallible forebelieving and Joe’s mowing, not whether 
Joe’s mowing is up to him. I see four options for answering this question. 
but, the two which are most independently attractive will not permit 
God’s infallible forebelief to uniquely threaten Joe’s freedom. And, 
the two which might have a chance at defending the claim that God’s 
infallible forebelief uniquely threatens Joe’s freedom are independently 
very unattractive.
begin with the two more independently attractive options for 
answering our explanation question. The first alternative for answering 
our explanation question is to affirm that Joe’s mowing at t100 explains 
God’s infallibly forebelieving at t1 that Joe will mow at t100. This answer to 
our explanation question has been almost universally affirmed by those 
who think that creaturely freedom and infallible divine foreknowledge 
are consistent.7 It is an independently attractive option for answering 
our explanation question. but, this alternative will not permit infallible 
foreknowledge to pose a unique threat for human freedom. For, strikingly, 
if this answer to our explanation question is given, then the supposition 
that God’s infallible forebelief about Joe uniquely threatens Joe’s freedom 
leads to an absurdity, given the plausible assumption that explanations 
are transitive.
7 To see this, consider what a wide variety of solutions to the freedom-foreknowledge 
argument have endorsed this idea that divine (fore)beliefs are explained by what makes 
their contents true: Augustinian solutions (see Hunt 1999), boethian solutions (see rota 
2010), molinist solutions (merricks 2011), and ockhamist solutions (see Plantinga 1986).
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To say that explanations are transitive is to say the following: for all 
explanations e, e’, and e’’, if e explains e’ and e’ explains e’’, then e explains 
e’’. The claim that explanations are transitive, like the claim that causes 
are transitive, has enjoyed widespread support, and it seems to make 
good sense of many ordinary examples.8 For instance, if I was late for 
the morning session because I felt sick, and I felt sick because I ate some 
bad fish last night, then I was late for the morning session because I ate 
some bad fish last night. If my moving my arm in a certain way explains 
why the marker moves in an ‘r’ pattern in contact with the board, and 
the marker’s moving in this pattern explains why there is an ‘r’ pattern of 
ink on the board, then my moving my arm in a certain way explains why 
there is an ‘r’ pattern of ink on the board. Transitivity appears to hold 
even when some of the explanations involved are (at least apparently) 
backwards explanations.9 If the volcano is smoking because it is going to 
explode, and the people are leaving because the volcano is smoking, then 
the people are leaving because the volcano is going to explode.
Suppose, then, that explanations are indeed transitive. We now run 
into an absurdity, given this first option concerning the explanatory 
relationship between God’s infallible forebelief and Joe’s mowing, if we 
wish to maintain that IDF poses a unique threat to human freedom. For, 
on this first option, Joe’s mowing at t100 is said to explain God’s infallible 
forebelief at t1 that Joe mows at t100. but, if IDF is to pose a unique threat 
to human freedom, then it must be that God’s infallible forebelief at t1 
that Joe mows at t100 uniquely explains why it isn’t up to Joe whether he 
mows at t100. Thus, given the transitivity of explanations, it follows that 
Joe’s mowing at t100 explains why it isn’t up to Joe whether he mows at 
t100. That is, it isn’t up to Joe whether he mows at t100 because Joe mows 
at t100. but, this is absurd! It cannot be that Joe’s freedom with respect 
to mowing is threatened by his very mowing – that by the very act of 
mowing Joe makes it the case that his mowing isn’t up to him. So, we 
must reject one of the suppositions which got us to this conclusion. 
Given that explanations are transitive, we must either reject the claim 
that God’s infallible forebelief poses a  special threat to Joe’s freedom, 
or we must reject the claim that Joe’s mowing his lawn at t100 explains 
8 For the transitivity of causation, see (Hall 2000). For the transitivity of explanation, 
see (Hasker 1997).
9 For a defence of the ubiquity of legitimate backward explanations, see (Jenkins and 
Nolan 2011). For criticism of this defence, see (byerly forthcoming a).
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God’s infallible forebelief that Joe mows. This first option for answering 
our explanation question, then, while independently attractive, cannot 
be offered by someone who wants to defend the idea that IDF poses 
a unique threat to human freedom.
There is a second option for answering our explanation question which 
is still somewhat independently attractive. on this option, Joe’s mowing 
and God’s forebelieving that Joe mows share a  common explanation. 
What explains God’s forebeliefs about Joe’s mowing and what explains 
Joe’s mowing is one and the same, though neither Joe’s mowing nor God’s 
forebelief explains the other. Apart from the first answer to our question 
above according to which Joe’s mowing explains God’s forebelief about 
his mowing, this way of pursuing this third strategy may be the most 
popular response to our question.
There are at least two ways of pursuing this answer to our question 
of which I am aware in the philosophical literature – a molinist account 
of divine foreknowledge and a theological determinist account of divine 
foreknowledge.10 After briefly characterizing these accounts here, I wish 
to show that if one answers the explanation question by appealing to one 
of them, then one cannot claim that IDF presents a  unique challenge 
for human freedom. Indeed, more generally, on this second option, IDF 
will not make an essential contribution to an explanation for why what 
humans do is not up to them.
begin with a brief characterization of molinism. The key to molinism 
is counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. These are subjunctive conditio-
nals whose antecedents specify circumstances that God might bring 
about and whose consequents specify what creatures would freely do in 
these circumstances. Thus, these counterfactuals have the form < were 
C the case, then S would do A freely > where C is a circumstance, S is 
a creature, and A is an action.11
on a  standard molinist account, the law of conditional excluded 
middle holds: for every circumstance C, agent S and action A, either 
< were C the case, S would freely do A > or < were C the case, S would not 
freely do A > is true. Further, whichever of these conditionals is in fact 
true is eternally true such that long before S is ever born, this conditional 
10 For standard defences of molinism, see (Flint 1998) and (Craig 1990). Standard 
defences of theological determinism are lacking in the philosophical literature; though, 
see (Wainwright 2001), (rudder-baker 2003), and (mcCann 1995).
11 For more details on what goes into these counterfactuals, see (Wierenga 2011).
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is true. Thus, this conditional is something which is a  possible object 
of knowledge even prior to creation, and the molinist tells us that it is 
known by God.
God’s knowledge of these conditionals is what allows God to have 
infallible foreknowledge of what creatures will freely do. For instance, 
for an agent S, God can know whether S will do A freely or will freely do 
something else by knowing all of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom 
pertaining to S and by knowing which circumstances God himself wills 
to bring about. The explanation, then, for how God knows that Joe will 
mow at t100 has to do with the circumstances C that obtain up to the point 
of Joe’s decision to mow together with the counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom which report what Joe would do in these circumstances. God 
knows that Joe will mow, then, because God knows these subjunctive 
conditionals and because God knows what circumstances he himself 
wills to bring about.
but, on at least one version of molinism, the explanation for why Joe 
mows at t100 is just the same as the explanation for how God knows that 
Joe will mow.12 Joe mows at t100 because some subjunctive conditional of 
the form < were C the case, Joe would freely mow > is true and God has 
willed to bring about circumstance C. Thus, on this version of molinism, 
the same facts that explain how God knows what his creatures will freely 
do explain why those creatures do what they do.
The theological determinist view of divine foreknowledge I have in 
mind says that creatures behave freely in the way they do because God 
has willed them to behave in this way, and his willing them to behave in 
this way causally brings it about that they behave in this way. In the same 
way, God knows what his creatures will freely do because he knows what 
he has willed for them to do, and he knows that what he wills them to do 
they will do. Thus, on this theological determinist view, God knows that 
Joe will mow at t100 for the same reason that Joe mows at t100 – because 
God has willed for Joe to mow at t100.
unfortunately, neither of these models for answering our explanation 
question will permit IDF itself to pose a unique threat to human freedom. 
For, on neither of these models does IDF make an essential contribution 
to an explanation of why human actions are not up to them. For each 
12 Though unpopular, a version of molinism which might take this approach would be 
one which views the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom as brute facts. For discussion 
of this view, see (Adams 1977).
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model, although there may be a threat posed to human freedom by the 
model, it is not a threat that depends in any way on the existence of IDF. 
rather, the conditions required for the existence of IDF, and not IDF 
itself, are themselves what pose the unique threat to human freedom.
Take the molinist model. If this model provides a unique explanation 
of why our actions are not up to us, it does so because the model requires 
the existence of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom together with 
divine willings – not because of IDF. If Joe’s mowing is not up to him 
because of the conditions required for this model, for instance, this is 
because of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom reporting that he would 
mow under certain circumstances together with facts about divine 
willings. If these facts uniquely explain why Joe’s mowing isn’t up to him, 
they do so whether or not they lead to IDF. These facts would continue 
to explain why Joe’s mowing wasn’t up to him, for instance, even if God 
didn’t hold any beliefs about Joe’s mowing. So, on this molinist model, 
IDF itself makes no essential contribution to an explanation for why Joe’s 
mowing isn’t up to him. And the same goes for the relationship between 
IDF and human actions more generally on this model. on this molinist 
model, the existence of IDF does not make an essential contribution to 
an explanation for why our actions are not up to us. Its contribution is at 
best a non-essential by-product of such an explanation. So, this molinist 
model will not permit IDF to pose a unique threat to human freedom.
Similar comments are in store for the theological determinist model. 
Here too, if there is a  threat posed to human freedom by the model, 
it is a threat posed independently of the existence of IDF. For, if there 
is a threat posed to human freedom by this model, it is a threat posed 
by the relationship between human action and divine willings. on this 
model, what humans do they do as a  result of God’s willing them to 
do so. If this relationship between divine willings and human actions 
uniquely explains why human actions aren’t up to humans, then it 
does so quite independently of whether IDF also exists. So, here too 
IDF cannot make an essential contribution to an explanation for why 
human actions are not up to us. And, so, IDF cannot here pose a unique 
threat to human freedom.
What goes for the molinist and theological determinist iterations of 
this second strategy plausibly goes for other imaginable iterations as well. 
on any version of this second strategy, what explains the existence of 
IDF also explains what humans do. but, for any such strategy, that which 
explains what humans do could explain what they do without explaining 
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the existence of IDF. Thus, for any iteration of this second strategy, it 
will not be the case that IDF itself makes an essential contribution to an 
explanation for why what humans do is not up to them. If models which 
follow this second strategy do uniquely explain why what humans do 
isn’t up to them, they will do so independently of the existence of IDF.
So much for the two answers to our explanation question which 
have some independent plausibility. The other two answers to this 
question, while they might allow for more hope concerning IDF posing 
a unique threat to human freedom, nonetheless suffer because they are 
independently implausible as answers to the explanation question.
Suppose, first, that one answers our explanation question by claiming 
that God’s infallible forebelief explains why Joe mows. Joe mows at 
t100 because God believes at t1 that Joe mows at t100. This response to 
our explanation question has perhaps the best shot at permitting IDF 
to uniquely explain why human actions are not up to us. For, it has 
a  good shot at permitting IDF to make an essential contribution to an 
explanation of why these actions aren’t up to us – a contribution which 
isn’t made without it. unfortunately, this answer to our question about the 
explanatory relationship between God’s forebelief and Joe’s mowing has 
not been popular at all.13 And, its unpopularity is for good reason. I will 
briefly discuss two problems for this account here which help to show why 
it is not an independently plausible response to our explanation question.
First, this account succumbs to a suspicious form of anti-realism. on 
this response to our explanation question, God’s beliefs determine how 
reality is. For, presumably, it will not be just Joe’s mowing that occurs 
because God believes it will occur, but any event is like this. For every 
event that occurs or doesn’t occur in the history of the world, it occurs 
because God believed it would occur or it doesn’t occur because God 
believed it wouldn’t occur. This view is objectionable, however. For, it 
seems that, even if per impossibile, were God to have decided not to hold 
a belief about whether Joe will mow at t100, Joe still would have either 
mowed or not mowed at t100.14 Insofar as the defender of the freedom-
13 This is not to say, however, that it has not been endorsed by some. Aquinas appears 
to have thought that this answer got the explanatory order of divine beliefs and human 
acts correct, at least. See Summa Theologica I, Q.14.A8. Aquinas, of course, did not think 
that God’s beliefs were in time. Thus, his view would escape the overdetermination 
problem highlighted in the text.
14 I  say ‘even if per impossibile’ because some, including myself, think that it is 
metaphysically impossible for God to fail to have a belief about whether Joe will mow. 
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foreknowledge argument finds this sort of anti-realism unattractive, as 
this author does, she will not want to advocate this answer to our question 
about the explanatory relationship between God’s infallible forebelief and 
Joe’s mowing. This answer to our question is independently implausible.
A second difficulty with this response to our explanation question has 
to do with its commitment to massive explanatory overdetermination. Joe 
mows at t100, according to this response, because God believed at t1 that he 
would mow at t100. but, why is t1 so important? Why not pick some other 
time at which God believed that Joe would mow at t100? Why not, for that 
matter, pick t100 itself? Presumably, at t100, God believes that Joe mows at 
t100. Why think that it is God’s beliefs at t1 that explain why Joe mows and 
not God’s beliefs at t100 instead? of course, it could be that God’s beliefs at 
both these times – indeed, at all of the times – explain why Joe mows. but, 
here again this answer to our question seems to have, if anything, gotten 
things backwards. Given this answer to our question, when we ask why 
Joe mowed at t100, our answer will be that he mowed at t100 because of what 
God believed at t1 and because of what God believed at t2 and because of 
what God believed at t3 and so on for every other time (perhaps including 
even the future times). but, this highlights a second unattractive feature 
of the present response to our explanation question. For this response 
unnecessarily adopts massive explanatory overdetermination. Joe’s 
mowing at t100, and any event at any time for that matter, will be massively 
explanatorily overdetermined by God’s beliefs at every time. A response 
to our explanation question, like the first two responses we considered, 
which didn’t require such massive explanatory overdetermination is far 
more independently attractive than this third answer.15 Thus, despite its 
They think that it is necessary that either Joe will mow or Joe will not mow, and that it 
is necessary that if Joe will mow God believed this and if Joe will not mow God believed 
that. If this is correct, then the conditional claim <were God to have decided not to hold 
a belief about whether Joe will mow, Joe still would have either mowed or not mowed> has 
an impossible antecedent. but, many, including myself, think that not all counterpossible 
claims like this are trivially true, though on some semantics for counterpossibles this 
is the case (see, e.g., (lewis 1973)). Instead, we think that some counterpossibles are   
non-trivially true and some are false. The counterpossible claim in the text, I contend, is 
non-trivially true. Yet, given the response to our explanation question we are considering 
in the text, this conditional cannot be true. I  take this as an objection to that answer 
to our explanation question. For more in defence of the non-trivial truth and falsity of 
counterpossible conditionals, see (merricks 2003), (berto 2009), and (Vander laan 2004).
15 That a view countenances massive and unnecessary explanatory overdetermination 
is commonly thought to be a  significant reason for rejecting that view. For some 
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potential promise for defending the idea the IDF poses a unique threat to 
human freedom, the present response to our explanation question should 
be rejected as independently implausible in light of its commitments to 
anti-realism and unnecessary explanatory overdetermination.
There is one final available response to our explanation question: 
claim that there is simply no explanatory relationship at all between 
God’s infallible forebelief that Joe will mow and Joe’s mowing. God 
doesn’t believe that Joe will mow because Joe will mow, nor will Joe mow 
because God believes Joe will mow, nor is there a common explanation 
for both God’s belief and Joe’s mowing. This answer to our explanation 
question, I submit, is woefully independently unattractive. It is woefully 
independently unattractive because it implies that something which 
should be explicable is inexplicable. For, what this response says about 
the relationship between God’s infallible forebelief about Joe and Joe’s 
mowing its advocates will also need to say about the relationship 
between any of God’s infallible forebeliefs about what humans will do 
and what these humans will do. Thus, for any proposition p concerning 
what a human being will do, the advocate of this solution will say that 
God will believe p if and only if p is true, but there will be no explanation 
of why this is so. The correspondence between divine beliefs about what 
humans will do and what humans will do is left entirely unexplained. 
It simply happens to be that for every claim p about what a human will 
do, God believes p if and only if p is true. He doesn’t believe it because 
it is true, nor is p true because he believes it, nor is there some common 
explanation for why both p is true and God believes p. It just happens 
to be that divine beliefs and human acts correspond. This commitment 
to the inexplicability of what cries out for explanation makes this final 
alternative woefully independently unattractive. There must be some 
kind of explanatory relation between IDF and what humans do. The only 
explanatory relationships there might be, however, have already been 
surveyed. And for each of these relationships, either the relationship 
proposed is independently unattractive or it will not permit IDF to 
uniquely threaten human freedom. Thus, I  conclude that there is no 
independently attractive response to our explanation question which 
will permit IDF to uniquely threaten human freedom. Plausibly, then, 
IDF cannot uniquely threaten human freedom. Human freedom is not 
representative samples of arguments which invoke explanatory overdetermination in 
this way, see (merricks 2003), (Kim 2005), and (Korman 2011).
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threatened by IDF itself; if it is incompatible with IDF, there must be 
some further explanation for this. In the next section, I briefly address 
this possibility.
III. From THe eXISTeNCe oF IDF To THe meCHANICS oF IDF
If the argument of the preceding section is sound, then the existence of 
IDF cannot uniquely threaten human freedom. This result would go some 
distance toward vindicating the intuition that some, like David Hunt, 
have had to the effect that mere IDF couldn’t possibly on its own threaten 
freedom. As Hunt queries, ‘How could a third-party’s knowledge of my 
future action, just by itself (and without special assumptions about the 
conditions under which such knowledge is possible), have any effect at 
all on the action, let alone transform it to such an extent that it no longer 
qualifies as free?’ (Hunt 1999: 20) If the argument of the preceding 
section is sound, then the answer to the query is of course that it cannot. 
The existence of IDF cannot uniquely threaten human freedom.
And yet this does not imply that IDF and human freedom are 
compatible. For, as the parenthetical remark in Hunt’s query indicates, 
there is more to ask about than the simple existence of IDF. We must 
also ask about how IDF is achieved. We must ask about the mechanics 
of IDF; to use Hunt’s idiom, we must ask about those ‘conditions under 
which such knowledge is possible’. For, it may be that while the bare 
existence of IDF does not pose any unique threat to human freedom, the 
existence of IDF requires some conditions which do pose such a threat. 
If the argument of the previous section is sound, then the existence of 
IDF cannot uniquely explain why what humans do isn’t up to them. but, 
human freedom could still be incompatible with IDF if the mechanics 
whereby IDF is achieved did uniquely explain why what humans do isn’t 
up to them. Thus, while IDF itself might not uniquely threaten human 
freedom, the mechanics required for securing it might.
To see just how such a  mechanics-based threat to freedom might 
come about, we should consider again the views which fell under the 
second response to our explanation question above. That response was 
to affirm that while neither God’s infallible forebeliefs nor human actions 
explain the other, they share a  common explanation. We considered 
two iterations of this response – a molinist iteration and a theological 
determinist iteration. Consider here again the theological determinist 
iteration. on this view, God has infallible foreknowledge of what humans 
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do, and humans do what they do, because God wills for human beings to 
do certain things. Human acts are, on this view, causally determined by 
divine willings. Now, according to many – libertarians, chiefly – this sort 
of account of the mechanics of IDF provides a very plausible example 
where the mechanics required for IDF, but not IDF itself, uniquely 
threatens human freedom. even on this theological determinist view, 
as we saw earlier, IDF itself cannot uniquely threaten human freedom. 
For, IDF won’t make an essential contribution to an explanation for 
why what humans do isn’t up to them. Yet, if the conditions required 
for the existence of IDF are the conditions specified by this theological 
determinist model, then it may well still be that IDF and human freedom 
are incompatible. For, it may be that the existence of IDF requires the 
existence of some conditions – here, infallible divine willings concerning 
creaturely acts – which themselves uniquely explain why what humans 
do isn’t up to them. These conditions, and not IDF itself, make an 
essential contribution to an explanation for why our actions are not 
up to us. Thus, we have a  plausible illustration of how the mechanics 
of IDF might uniquely threaten human freedom, even though the bare 
existence of IDF cannot.
The observation that the mechanics of IDF may uniquely threaten 
freedom even though IDF itself cannot tells us something important 
about a  promising future direction for discussion of freedom and 
foreknowledge. For, surprisingly, the arguments most commonly 
forwarded to demonstrate the incompatibility of IDF and human freedom 
– arguments like that presented in section one – do not say a word about 
the mechanics of IDF. They attempt to show that IDF is incompatible 
with human freedom quite apart from any claims about the mechanics 
of IDF. Yet, if the argument of this paper is sound, this approach fails 
to capitalize on an important facet of what is most pressing concerning 
the relationship between IDF and human freedom. For, whether IDF is 
compatible with human freedom depends at least in significant part on 
the sort of mechanics required for the existence of IDF. As we have seen, 
IDF itself cannot uniquely threaten human freedom; but, the conditions 
required for the existence of IDF – the conditions which account for the 
mechanics of IDF – may indeed uniquely threaten human freedom. Thus, 
it would be profitable for future discussion of freedom and foreknowledge 
to focus squarely on this very issue. Instead of focusing on arguments 
which would attempt to establish the incompatibility of freedom and 
IDF independently of engaging the question of the mechanics of IDF, 
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philosophers of religion would be well-served to focus on an argument 
which might attempt to establish the incompatibility of IDF and human 
freedom by focusing on this very question about the mechanics of IDF.
one way to help focus discussion of freedom and foreknowledge on 
the mechanics of IDF would therefore be to provide an argument for the 
incompatibility of freedom and foreknowledge which would require the 
compatibilist about freedom and foreknowledge to pursue further work 
on the mechanics of IDF in order to adequately respond to it. In this vein, 
I propose the following dilemma (though of course I am not defending 
this dilemma here – I am simply offering it for the purpose of guiding 
future discussion of IDF and human freedom). either the mechanics 
whereby IDF is supposed to be achieved is some mechanics for achieving 
foreknowledge with which human beings are familiar or it is not. If the 
mechanics whereby IDF is supposed to be achieved is a mechanics for 
achieving foreknowledge with which human beings are familiar, then 
this mechanics uniquely threatens human freedom. For, the only way 
of achieving foreknowledge – particularly, foreknowledge of distantly 
future events – with which we are familiar involves believing claims 
about the future on the basis of what is known about the past and laws of 
nature. And, if this is how IDF is achieved, then we will have a significant 
threat to human freedom because the mechanics required for IDF will 
require that human actions are causally determined.16 If, however, the 
mechanics whereby IDF is supposed to be achieved is not a mechanics 
for securing foreknowledge with which humans are familiar, then we 
cannot be confident that it indeed makes possible IDF. For, we will not 
be in a  position to judge whether it is a  mechanics which can secure 
foreknowledge. Thus, either the mechanics whereby IDF is supposed 
to be achieved is one which uniquely threatens human freedom or it is 
not one which we can be confident makes possible IDF. either way, we 
cannot be confident that IDF is compatible with human freedom.17
The argument challenges the compatibilist about freedom and 
foreknowledge to articulate and defend an account of the mechanics 
of IDF with two central features. First, the account must provide 
a  mechanics for divine forebelief with which we humans are familiar 
enough to make an informed judgment about whether it can in fact secure 
16 At least, human actions will be the causal consequences of the past and laws of 
nature. It may be that these laws are indeterministic.
17 For a related presentation of such an argument from the mechanics of foreknowledge, 
see (byerly forthcoming b).
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foreknowledge. Second, the conditions required by the account must not 
uniquely threaten human freedom. Articulating and defending such an 
account of the mechanics of IDF is extremely difficult, and very few have 
taken up the task.18 Instead, what one typically finds compatibilists about 
freedom and foreknowledge doing is defending one or another response 
to arguments for the incompatibility of IDF and human freedom like the 
argument discussed in section one of this paper which don’t require the 
compatibilist to say anything about the mechanics of IDF. As has been 
argued here, there is a more interesting and important challenge for the 
compatibilist to address. That is the challenge of providing a mechanics 
for divine foreknowledge with the features articulated here. my hope is 
that the argument for the incompatibility of freedom and foreknowledge 
articulated here could serve as a helpful starting point for this promising 
direction of future discussion in the freedom-foreknowledge debate.
CoNCluSIoN
The main goal of this paper has been to argue that infallible divine 
foreknowledge cannot uniquely threaten human freedom. This is 
because infallible divine foreknowledge by itself cannot make an 
essential contribution to an explanation for why our actions are not up to 
us. Yet, this fact alone does not show that infallible divine foreknowledge 
and human freedom are compatible. For, it may be that the mechanics 
whereby infallible divine foreknowledge is achieved uniquely threatens 
human freedom. This paper has suggested that future discussion of 
freedom and foreknowledge focus on this latter issue, and has provided 
an argument which will help to lay a foundation for such discussion.
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